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governance models of the EU 
and China
Abstract
Global governance is an ambiguous concept. Based on the generalization and summary 
of the definition and theory of global governance, this article identifies the lack of 
regional features of global governance studies in the present literature. Building a 
framework based on comparative politics, the author conducts a comparative study of 
the EU and China on the models of global governance, and summarizes three types 
of global governance concepts: constitutionalism based on human rights, hegemonic 
liberalism and egalitarianism based on sovereignty. In the end, it looks ahead to the 
developing trends of global governance, in the future.
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1. Introduction1
At present, “global governance” has become a trendy term; there are more and more 
books on it in the disciplines of economics, politics and international relations, but 
regional studies of global governance are rarely seen. As the author observes, there 
is no overwhelming authoritative opinion or “international standards” about what 
norms global governance should obey. On the contrary, it merits our attention that the 
major countries have raised their specific views on global governance as shown in their 
diplomatic, economic and social policies. Therefore, the paper attempts here to design 
a theoretical framework, observe and summarize the global governance concepts in 
different regions in an approach of comparative politics, and categorize and compare 
those global governance concepts and policies in order to draw readers a map of the 
quite diverse global governance views. 
2. Is Global Governance a Singular Form? The Discipline of International  
 Relations (IR) or Comparative Studies (CP)
Like the definition of “Governance”, “Global governance” is also an ambiguous concept. 
On one side, Global governance is seen as a description of the international cooperation 
taking place in the present era of globalization. International cooperation took on a 
different form during the Cold War, so the former needs to be reconceptualised/ replaced 
by a new term – governance. The actors of international cooperation today include 
governments, but are not limited to governments only. “Governance encompasses 
every institution and organization in society, from the family to the state”, and the state 
(political and administrative institutions), civil society organizations and the private 
sector are all the domains of governance (UNDP, 1997). The state’s monopoly on decision-
making is broken, and the number of participants increased. Regarding approaches and 
methods, governance stresses that decisions are non-obligatory. Governments should 
adopt the new non-violate administrative means and, meanwhile, it is very important 
to explore ways of building the partnership between governments, NGOs, corporations 
and individuals, or the new form of self-management. 
On the other hand, global governance is also a norm that some international relations 
theories believe the international society should develop to overcome the status quo 
anarchy situation. Given the anarchic state of the world, different than with the compulsory 
legal approaches, governance stressed that shared values and international regimes are 
more efficient approaches toward realizing consensus and binding agreements. In a 
world of globalization, many western politicians and scholars think that either shared 
values or jointly established formal systems or informal habits can promote actors such 
as the states in order to surpass the conditions of international anarchy and realize 
cooperation.
 
1 The author would like to thank Dr. May-Britt Stumbaum, Olivia Gippner, Garima Mohan, and Jizhou 
Zhao for their ideas and comments on earlier versions of this working paper.
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Apart from the empirical studies on global governance in specific areas like finance, 
environment, water resource management, anti-terrorism and so on, the majority 
of the exploration and construction of global governance theories is undertaken by 
the IR scholars. Currently, in the school of western International Relations theories, 
International Institutionalism, Cosmopolitanism and Neo-medievalism are the three 
representative ideas, and they all are concerned with global governance. Affected by the 
rejuvenation of institutionalism in economics since the 1970s (March and Olsen 1989) 
and developed through the Neo-liberalism of International Relations theory (Keohane 
1984; Keohane and Nye 1977), International Institutionalism believes that international 
regimes, rules and institutions can tackle international affairs, or at least, are one of 
the major forces dealing with international affairs (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 
1977; Young 1999). International institutionalism still recognizes that the states are the 
most important actors of global governance, whereas Cosmopolitanism is more radical, 
attempting to build a world Constitution and international democratic polity based 
on the political philosophy of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and human community saying 
(Held 1995). The global governance of Cosmopolitanism regards individuals rather than 
states as the subjects of international laws (Held 2002), in line with the principles of 
individualism, mutual recognition, and justice and rationality. Taking a middle stance 
between International Institutionalism and Cosmopolitanism, Neo-medievalism holds 
that multiple authorities are appearing in the current post-modern world, as in the 
Middle Ages, a time when religious authorities, kings, lords and guilds co-existed in 
Western Europe. The public owes multiple allegiances to the international institutions. 
The nation-states and cross-border market economy are competing for power in the 
globalization era. People are absorbed into a complex social recognition network. The 
concept of sovereignty is vanishing. Modern states have to share jurisdiction over their 
citizens with regional and global authorities as well as sub-state and sub-nation ones 
(Bull 2002; Friedrichs 2001).
IR studies describe and analyse global governance by emphasizing different factors (also 
debating the relative importance of institutions and norms), viewing the international 
society as a whole. Meanwhile, global governance, seen either as an isolated 
phenomenon or as the norm is too complex to just be observed on the global level. 
Firstly, a description of the outcome of international cooperation in the globalization era 
(or global governance) cannot replace an investigation into the reasons that negotiators 
or participants hold these standings and have such policies. It is necessary to understand 
how the specific state or region comes in to play to form global governance, vis-a-
vis counter-research such as that undertaken by IR studies. Secondly, normatively, IR 
studies assume the global governance principles to be universal and fixed, and that all of 
them could be applied to all people in all regions. This is not realistic, however. Actors in 
global governance activities, either national governments, local governments, or NGOs, 
evidently have their individual characters and normative attitudes when participating in 
international cooperation. Whether their behaviour model may or may not be affected 
(or be called ‘socialized’) by international norms (Risse 1999, 1), still depends in large 
part on their interest and is restricted by the concepts originating from their particular 
history, geography and political culture. 
The discipline of Comparative Politics could afford a new viewpoint from which to observe 
global governance and appropriately complement the shortages of the IR theories 
mentioned above. CP studies’ research path is directed from the domestic politics to the 
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international system, while IR focuses on the actors’ feedback into the system. In terms 
of the importance of analyzing the actor’s motives and behaviour models that make 
up international cooperation, there exists a need to check the global governance with a 
Comparative Politics methodology against the background of globalization. 
Politics has been defined as the art or science of government. Now, the concept of 
“governance” enriches the connotation of politics. A study of global governance through 
the discipline of comparative politics also needs to take into consideration the relationship 
between government and other global actors, such as international organizations, NGOs 
and multinational corporations. At the same time, global governance represents the 
vision and outlook of all sides towards a future world order, to some extent; meanwhile, 
many countries and regions in the world have developed their own views and models of 
globalization and global governance today. Therefore, the author thinks it is necessary 
to adopt a comparative approach to summarize their characteristics and identify their 
differences, so as to explore the possibility of cooperation. As summarized above, the 
actors and approaches are the two major components of global governance. In addition, 
the importance of global governance has been reflected in the normative study, and 
different values will usually lead to contradictory judges, so that we can draw interesting 
conclusions by comparing how important the countries or regions think the different 
actors are, as well as their governance approaches and values. The governance actors can 
be states, inter-governmental international organizations and global non-governmental 
organizations, and different regional global governance models treat them all differently. 
As for global governance models, all actors recognize equality, democratization, and 
the development of institutionalized cooperation, but they have different opinions on 
the degrees of these values. There are two key points here; the first is how to regard 
state sovereignty, and the second is the use of force. Governance values represent the 
nuclear core values of different regions, and the author attempts to summarize the most 
representative values of different countries and regions.  
This article attempts to conduct a comparative study of global governance models, and 
because it is plausible to assume that the concepts propagated by the most powerful 
economies will have the strongest impact on the actual design and implementation 
of global governance, the author investigates here the EU, the US and China (in the 
order of GDP value). Admittedly, it would be enlightening to study the state systems 
and social-political structures and the relations between the private actors and public 
actors, as these will evidently have an impact on the formulation of concepts. This study 
will, from the perspective of foreign policies, however, extract and summarize the global 
governance concepts by scrutinizing governmental statements of different kinds, and 
the writings of the representative scholars and political figures. Based on a comparative 
framework, Table 1 below lists the differences between the global governance models as 
propagated by and in the EU and China, and the following three sections will further 
explore the differences. 
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3. The Global Governance Concept of the EU’s Constitutionalism
Europe is the most adamant advocate for global governance. The EU’s governance practice 
has a bearing on European countries’ viewpoints on global governance. The EU is a hybrid 
of an inter-governmental international organization and a quasi-federal state, known 
as a sui-generis polity, and highly supranational. The EU itself is a full demonstration 
of the concept of governance, in that EU members delegate their sovereignty to EU 
supranational institutions such as the EU Council, European Parliament, and European 
Court of Justice to a degree much higher than that of other international organizations 
or regional organizations such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, and the Latin American Common Market. As the inventor of the concept of 
sovereignty, however, European countries place less emphasis on sovereignty than do 
other regions of the world. In the European integration process, for over half a century 
after World War II, through jointly setting up the European Common Market, EU member 
states delegated to EU institutions their exclusive powers of independently drafting trade 
and agriculture policies, establishing market rules and conducting market supervision. 
After the European Economic and Monetary Union was founded, they delegated their 
powers of issuing bank notes to the joint institution---the European Central Bank. 
As regards ideology and institution building, the EU is the pioneer of supranational 
governance. The EU makes decisions after the relative European institutions, member 
state governments and parliaments, different professional organizations, interest groups 
and NGOs, and sub-national actors widely participate in discussions, and negotiate and 
deliberate to reach agreements. After continued accumulation, it has formed a set of 
complicated mechanism systems, and it cannot maintain proper operation without 
A comparative study of global governance models of the EU and China| 9
established rules. Likewise, negotiators and participants cannot reach consensus and 
compromises to advance European integration to its present depth without the same or 
similar beliefs and mindsets. In addition, another feature of the European integration is 
that EU laws have extended to many aspects of people’s lives. The ECJ and member state 
courts have constructed a comprehensive coordinated judicial system. Currently, EU 
legislation has accounted for around half of the new legislations of European countries. 
Even for the UK, which is not fully committed to the EU, two-thirds of its economic and 
social legislation was formulated by British ministers along with other European peers 
in Brussels. For the EU’s fundamental treaties, the drafting process is an important 
integration process. In 2005, France and the Netherlands vetoed a referendum on the 
EU Constitutional Treaty, and as a result, the word “Constitutional” had to be deleted 
and the treaty had to be changed to the Lisbon Treaty to make it effective. However, 
some researchers on EU studies note that, since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, 
the EU has repeatedly revised it, and there have emerged more and more supranational 
legal cases and practices, all such development in itself being a constitutional process 
(Weiler 1998).
The concept evident in European governance is the original form of the global governance 
concept of EU and European countries. The famous German thinker Jürgen Habermas 
represents well the thinking of European elites. As for globalization, he sees a tension 
between nation states‘ activity and the requirement of globally integrated production, 
stating that as economics are getting more and more trans-nationalized, especially as 
the financial market and industrial production are trans- nationalized and labor markets 
are globalized, the governments of nation states realize that they have to forebear the 
fallouts, such as the increasing rise in unemployment rates and the marginalization of 
minority groups in order to keep their international competitiveness. If social welfare 
countries still want to keep high welfare, and the lower-classes are not abandoned, cross-
border subjects are essential. Only cross-national integral subjects such as European 
Communities can exert influences on global systems through the coordinated interior 
mode. Under the pressure of market globalization, politics can only successfully build a 
sustainable infrastructure for a world-internal politics from a broader perspective, and 
politics must grow with the globalized market (Habermas 2001). The EU was merely a 
small test conjured by Habermas as “a global governance mechanism without world 
government”, testing whether a clique composed of competent managers in world 
politics could enlarge a temporarily loose network of supranational polities in a changed 
world organization’s framework, and whether it were possible to shift a world-internal 
politics in this direction but without a world government (Habermas 1999). 
Here, Juergen Habermas is exploring a world political order and organizational form 
in the post-national era, and this world order is different from US strategic thinking. 
In May 2005, at the 22nd Conference of the International Association for Philosophy of 
Law and Social Philosophy held in Granada, Spain, Habermas introduced, in his lecture 
“The Kantian Project of Cosmopolitan Law - And What It Means Today”, Kant’s idea of 
a “cosmopolitan condition”, which Habermas identified as a “world republic” in which 
international law is totally constitutionalized. Constitutionalization of international law 
only evolved in the direction of Kant’s idea after the end of World War II. However, with 
the end of bi-polar world order and the US becoming the only super-nation, as well 
as the birth of the neo-liberal world order concept, Kantian thought was criticized by 
both traditional realism and liberalism. Habermas termed such liberalism “hegemony 
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liberalism”, and argued that hegemony liberalism is problematic from the perspective of 
both norms and practice. He maintained that the UN as the core of international society 
is still of vital importance, and that its defect did not justify the abandonment of the 
Kantian project (Habermas 2005). Many European politicians also agreed with Habermas. 
For example, the former German Ambassador to Beijing Volker Stanzel explained the 
importance of international organizations such as the UN, and said that the reason for 
the international organizations functioning between the two super-powers during the 
Cold-War era was to avoid “disorderly” conflicts, which might cause a “hot-war” between 
the US and the USSR. But, in the post-Cold-War era, many institutional agencies 
malfunctioned or even broke up. The fact that all successive Secretaries-General of the 
UN tried hard to adapt the UN to the new situation has proven that if we want to shun the 
unaccountable risks caused by complex conflicts, we need a new world order, or at least 
new “Rules of the Road” (Stanzel 2008). He also emphasized the rule of international 
law, saying that “in order to realize a new world stability, and in order to build a new 
stable world order based on norms, which will define the norms for the future stable 
mechanism, to replace the collapsing Cold-War institution, the whole world should be 
more and more convicted of the importance of international law”, especially pointing 
out that “the most important is that the countries which are the new centre should be 
convicted of the importance of international law” (Stanzel 2008), by which he hoped to 
bring rising countries such as China into the bindings of an international law framework. 
In general, Europe has placed less emphasis on nation states than other regions, 
reflected from the EU and European countries’ global governance plans. Europe is 
widely recognized as having entered a post-nation state era. Due to the influence of 
post-modern thought, the bitter lessons from the two world wars, and the supranational 
experience of European integration, the European public, especially the elites, voice a 
profound criticism of nationalism and scepticism of the concept of states. Of course, 
this is not to say that Europe has gone beyond the nation-state phase; the EU and their 
member states have a clear understanding of the role of states. In European governance 
mechanisms, states are still the core subject of governance, and in international affairs, 
it has been proven that the states are still the irreplaceable actors in the international 
community. 
The EU and its member states have high expectations of inter-governmental organizations. 
They themselves are the biggest participants in international organizations, and they 
attach great importance to introducing their institutions and values to international 
organizations to bring their “soft power” into play. The EU and their member states are 
the largest force in peace-keeping campaigns of international organizations such as the 
UN, accounting for over half of peace-keepers in the world. Around 70 percent of foreign 
aid in the world is offered by the EU and EU countries. The EU advocates multilateralism 
in the international community, and maintains the authority of the United Nations. Even 
in the Libya crisis of 2011, France and the UK still worked hard to obtain the mandate of 
the UN Security Council. Besides inter-governmental international organizations, the 
EU and EU countries share a deep collaboration with a number of global NGOs. They 
attach importance to and borrow the network and human resources of global NGOs in 
information gathering, supervision and operation, and in reward, they provide the NGOs 
with funding and project set-up. Some European elites have raised the role of NGOs to 
a strategic level. During the Kosovo war, German scholar Thomas Risse commented that 
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the biggest military powers such as NATO and the US have to serve NGOs like Amnesty 
International (Risse 1999). 
In global governance approaches, on one hand the EU pays attention to maintaining 
the effectiveness of international institutions and, on the other hand, lays stress on 
the normative influence, trying to promote the values of liberty, democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law. On the relations between sovereignty and human rights, 
the mainstream opinion of European politics, academics and media is that the former 
should be subject to the latter. The Council of Europe established in 1950 by the Western 
European countries signed the European Convention on Human Rights, collectively 
ensuring and implementing some rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed 
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. They also 
institutionalized these rights and freedoms by founding the European Human Rights 
Council and Europe Human Rights Court to mediate and rule human rights cases in the 
member states. During the Cold-War period, European countries attached importance 
to cooperation with international organizations to promote human rights in the world. 
For example, in the late 1980s, there were broad discussions with the NGOs as the 
core, led by France about whether to recognize the “right to humanitarian relief”. The 
UN General Assembly was responsive to the discussion, and loosened the principle 
requiring the consent of the recipient country in 1988, 1990 and 1991 to make foreign 
relief in natural disasters and hunger situations more effective. After the Cold War, 
especially after the Kosovo war, the principle of “human rights priority” in European 
international law and international politics has become more and more prominent. In 
1999, at the seminar of “Incremental Governance” which Tony Blair and Bill Clinton both 
attended in Florence, Italy, the participants from both academia and governments fully 
discussed the legitimacy of humanitarian interference. The mainstream opinion held 
that it was necessary for the western countries to take action, civilian or military, because 
humanitarian crises are like “fires on the neighbours”. Thomas Risse, German scholar 
on international relations, said that wars can only be launched for humanitarianism in 
the post-Cold-War era (Risse 1999). But, he also emphasized that the UNSC was the 
only institution to endow humanitarianism intervention legitimacy, and is the standard 
whether the international community agrees or not, the Kosovo war being the only 
exception to the UN mandate. 
The humanitarian intervention approaches of the EU and European countries are 
rational, taking the conditions and cost of intervention into consideration. If military 
intervention cannot stop a humanitarian crisis, military intervention should be avoided. 
Compared with the US, the EU focuses more on civilian means. It had once for quite a 
long time acted as a cleaning crew for US, in which case the US took the lead and Europe 
cleaned up the mess, undertaking the post-war rebuilding and peace-keeping. But the 
Libya crisis in 2011 has shown that under certain conditions, Europe can also be the 
pioneer. Currently, humanitarianism has become the dominant and primary concept in 
the minds of many Europeans. And European politicians have reached the consensus 
that in the era of globalization, people who violate international law and basic human 
rights should be punished, and the sovereignty of nation-states can be downplayed 
(Zhao 2011).
In general, Europe’s global governance plan is the enlargement of the EU’s constitutional 
design, and the continuation of the Kantian democratic community project. As for how 
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to overcome the chaos and wars brought about by anarchy in a world anarchic state, the 
EU and its member states place hope on the strengthening of international institutions 
and the application of international norms. Compared with any other region in the 
world, the EU puts more stress on international law to promote the institutionalization of 
international law, and is the most active advocate for setting up the International Judicial 
Court at the UN; it also hopes to promote the rule of law in other countries through legal 
aid and law training programs, and the abolishment of the death penalty and protection 
of civilian’s political freedom is the core part. Therefore, global constitutionalism based 
on human rights is the biggest feature of the EU’s global governance concept.
The most striking example of constitutionalism as the core value of Europe’s global 
governance is the issue of universal jurisdiction. On June 18, 2001, a Belgian domestic 
court decided to put four Rwandese people into prison for genocide in Rwanda in 1994. 
This is the first time in the history of international law or international relations that 
universal jurisdiction was applied, breaking with the principle of territorial jurisdiction 
and national jurisdiction adopted by international criminal law. The crime was committed 
in Rwanda, the criminals were Rwandese, and the victims were Rwandese, all having no 
relations with Belgium. But, adopting the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Belgian 
court handled the cases having no relations with their countries or civilians. After that, 
many people cited the case to make charges against the state heads of other countries 
in Belgium. Under pressure from the US, Belgium repealed the law on universal 
jurisdiction, and introduced a new law on extraterritorial jurisdiction consistent with 
that of most other European countries (Dixon, Khan and May 2003). However, such an 
unsuccessful attempt has proven the depth of the global constitutionalism concept in 
Europe from the reverse perspective. 
4. China’s Egalitarian Global Governance Concept
Global governance is a foreign phrase to China, taken into consideration the fact that the 
internationalization process of the People’s Republic of China has taken around 40 years 
if China’s entry to the UN in 1997 is reckoned as the start of China’s internationalization. 
With the rise of economic globalization in the 1990s, especially after China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s economy has been deeper and deeper 
intertwined with the world economy, and China has confronted more and more interna-
tional economic global governance problems. Therefore, after deliberation and discus-
sion, the Chinese government recognized the necessity of global economic governance 
and defined China’s fundamental position, viewpoints and goals. On December 11, 2011, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao said that China should resolutely be a participant in global 
economic governance at the high-level forum marking the tenth anniversary of China’s 
entry into the WTO (Hu 2011). Earlier than that, State Council Dai Bingguo systemati-
cally expounded China’s basic viewpoints on global economic governance in July of 2009 
when attending the G8 and developing countries dialogue in L’ Aquila as stated below:
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I. Goal of governance. The fundamental goal of global economic governance is to push 
forward the development of the global economy in a balanced, universally beneficial 
and win-win manner. ‘Balance’ means taking into account the needs and balancing 
the concerns of both the developed and the developing countries. ‘Universal benefit’ 
means maintaining the interests and bringing tangible benefits to all the countries 
in the world and their people. ‘Win-win’ means combining the interests and linking 
the development of one country with all the others. 
II. Participants of governance. Global economic governance should be participated in 
by all the countries around the world. Countries, no matter large or small, strong or 
weak, rich or poor, are all parts of the global economy and should participate in the 
governance equally and enjoy relevant representativeness, voice and decision-mak-
ing rights. Equal participation is reflected not only in form but more importantly in 
substantial content and decision-making. Only in this way can we ensure rationality 
and justice and guarantee the reputation and effectiveness of the global economic 
governance.
III. Way of governance. Global economic governance requires countries to solve the 
difficulties caused by economic globalization through consultations and cooperation. 
It is important to follow the democracy principle, listen to the opinions of all parties 
concerned, take care of and reflect the interests and demands of all countries, espe-
cially the developing ones. We should respect differences, take into consideration the 
different national conditions of countries and allow different approaches of the de-
veloped and the developing countries. We should insist on and advocate cooperation 
and encourage countries to strengthen communication and coordination and use 
their advantages respectively to address the common challenges. 
IV. Mechanisms of governance. Global economic governance requires appropriate 
mechanism arrangements. The development of a world economy makes it hard 
for some mechanisms to fully reflect the demands of the international community. 
Representativeness needs to be expanded to effectively tackle the global challenges. 
Governance should be targeted at problems in different areas and at various levels. In 
terms of governance mechanisms, relevant international standards and rules should 
be formulated on the basis of equal consultations and consensus reached among 
all the interested parties. Experience and best practices should be disseminated and 
countries should intensify exchanges and cooperation to jointly build an effective 
global economic governance structure. 
The Chinese government has realized that the world economy and economic globaliza-
tion need to be managed, and has its own ideas of how to manage them. From the state-
ments of Chinese leaders, “equality” is the key word of China’s normative requirement. 
The Chinese government believes that global economic governance should achieve the 
equal positioning of developed countries and developing countries and that the nations, 
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as the basic actors, should address problems on the basis of equal deliberation. On the 
one hand, this is a realistic consideration by China. As a developing country, China be-
lieves it is necessary to expand representativeness and the right to voice opinions of de-
veloping countries in international organizations and the international system, to allow 
the developing countries to get equally involved in decision-making of international 
affairs, to change the unbalanced South-North relations, and to change the situation 
in which western countries dominate a hegemonic international society. These are all 
conducive to improving China’s international influence of power, in line with China’s 
national interests. On the other hand, if we review China’s 60-year diplomatic history, we 
will find the principle of equality has been China’s consistent diplomatic value and norm. 
This is inseparable from China’s modern historic experience of being bullied by foreign 
countries since the Opium War in the 19th century, when the Chinese for generations 
could not obtain equal standing in the world. Finally, through fierce, long-term struggles, 
the Chinese people overthrew the “old society” which contained certain kinds of unequal 
treaties. After terminating an old era that featured inequality, the Chinese people natu-
rally harbour an ideal of a world order that is one with equality. Chinese future diplomacy, 
therefore, should fundamentally reflect the principle of equality, and equality has been 
internalized as China’s diplomatic ethics. Such a concept, in the author’s opinion, has a 
great impact on the forming of China’s global economic governance principle. 
In “high politics”, such as the politics and security area, the Chinese government shows 
hesitation over the adoption of global governance. Its main concern is that the western 
countries will use this as an excuse to interfere in China’s internal affairs, threatening 
China’s sovereignty, integrity and diplomatic independence. After all, the theories of 
global governance all originated in the West, and the influence of developed countries 
far surpasses that of developing countries in the international organizations, no matter 
whether inter-governmental or global civil ones. The mechanism of global governance is 
mainly designed and formulated by the West, and reflects the values of the West. In ad-
dition, global governance has the tendency to weaken sovereignty, making it potentially 
become the theoretical groundings and rhetoric of interference in the internal affairs of 
other countries and regions2. However, given the fact that globalization has spilled over 
from the economic field into politics, environment, culture, science and technology, po-
lice, non-traditional security, or even traditional security such as arms control, China has 
conducted multi-phase and all-round substantial cooperation with international orga-
nizations, social corporate, multi-national companies and local governments. If we only 
focus on the intergovernmental exchanges, quite a number of China’s fresh diplomatic 
exchanges will be overlooked. Meanwhile, China should raise its own understanding and 
cognition of the global governance concept. Actually, for some people, global governance 
means establishing a world government and setting up laws and regulations, and for 
2 Some Chinese scholars pointed out the negative effects when they introduced the global governance 
concept and theories into China, such as Yu Keping and Cai Tuo (Yu 2002 and Cai 2004). 
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other people, it means setting up the mechanism which has the support of sovereignty 
states and promotes mutual understanding and operations. China’s global governance 
concept is obviously different from that of the US or Europe, and presents its own ideas 
and features.
Chinese President Hu Jintao said in his report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party 
Congress that “we maintain that the people of all countries should join hands and strive 
to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. To this end, all 
countries should uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, ob-
serve international law and universally recognized norms of international relations, and 
promote democracy, harmony, collaboration and win-win solutions in international rela-
tions. Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an 
equal footing in a common endeavour to promote democracy in international relations. 
Economically, they should cooperate with each other, draw on each other’s strengths 
and work together to advance economic globalization in the direction of balanced devel-
opment, shared benefits and win-win progress. Culturally, they should learn from each 
other in the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences, respect the 
diversity of the world, and make joint efforts to advance human civilization. In the area 
of security, they should trust each other, strengthen cooperation, settle international 
disputes by peaceful means rather than by war, and work together to safeguard peace 
and stability in the world. On environmental issues, they should assist and cooperate 
with each other in conservation efforts to take good care of the Earth, the only home 
of human beings.” These normative propositions have generally outlined the content 
of China’s global governance concept. In political governance, China maintains that all 
countries should comply with the principles of international law and devote themselves 
to the democratization of international relations. The democratization of international 
relations means that “all countries, big and small, strong and weak, rich and poor, are 
equal. We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their 
own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries 
or impose our own will on them.” (Hu, 2007) The core value is equality. In the way of 
governance, China abandons the use of force, insists on deliberation, and maintains that 
a civil approach is the only choice for necessary international interference. Equality, toler-
ance and mutual assistance are the philosophical principles of China’s global governance 
position, and expressed in its actual abroad operations. It is the cultural background of 
China’s global governance concept to respect world diversity, respect the independent 
choices of all countries, and believe in the capacity of people in other countries to address 
their internal affairs. Therefore, in general, China has established a global governance 
concept which we can generalize as “an egalitarian global governance concept on the 
basis of state sovereignty”.
Nation-states are the basic actors from China’s global governance perspective, but China 
does not exclude the coordination, communication and management functions of in-
ter-governmental international organizations in international affairs. According to the 
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statistics research of Canadian scholar Alairstair Iain Johnston, during the mid-1960s to 
mid-1990s, China surged to accede to around 80 percent of the international organiza-
tions, a change from being totally isolated from international organizations. His research 
further showed that once entry to international organizations was gained, the Chinese 
government has not attempted to challenge the basic goals of the international organi-
zations, nor the methods or policies of international organizations to better serve their 
interests (Johnston 2003). Indeed, China has showed great respect to the inter-govern-
mental international organization system, with the UN as the centre. Upon signing or 
after formally joining an international organization, no matter whether in trade, environ-
ment, technology, arms control, human rights or peace keeping, China seldom withdrew 
or violated treaties like the US did. International treaties and international organizations 
have a far-reaching influence on China. For example, during the ten years of China’s ac-
cession to the WTO, China’s general customs duty level has dropped from 15.3 percent to 
9.8 percent. Since then, the central government has reviewed over 2,300 domestic laws, 
regulations and departmental rules, and local governments have reviewed over 190,000 
regional policies and regulations, according to the requirement of the WTO agreement 
(Hu 2011). Since the 1990s, China has gradually freed itself from passively adapting to 
international organizations and begun to actively and effectively take part in the activ-
ities of international organizations and the drafting of international rules. For exam-
ple, it initiated and organized regional multi-lateral organizations such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and Basic Block, and participated in the G20. After the world 
financial crisis broke out in 2008, China proposed to speed up the structural reforms 
of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to establish a sound international 
financial regulatory regime, improve the international money system and expand its rep-
resentativeness, and improve the voting rights of developing countries. 
China is more cautious than Europe and the US when handling international NGOs. 
China’s domestic social administration is led by the government, China’s civil society 
organizations are under development, and the government administration is strict. 
According to the regulation released by the Chinese State Council in 1998, the Chinese 
government has two management principles concerning NGOs: one is that all NGOs 
should register at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the second is that the Civil Affairs 
Ministry is in charge of registration and enrolment of NGOs and the department in 
charge of the particular business is responsible for daily management. Therefore, be-
sides registration, international NGOs must find a Chinese partner, in most cases, a 
counterpart in the government if they want to operate in China (Zhou et. 2007). With 
the deepening of China’s opening up and reform, many international NGOs have coop-
erated with Chinese government agencies to get deeply involved in the development of 
China’s poverty reduction, healthcare, environmental protection, training, human rights 
and education. They provided funding, technology and experiences, brought about ad-
vanced ideas, and built up international networks. The then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
explicitly said that the Chinese government would like to be committed to the cause of 
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China’s poverty reduction with international organizations, international NGOs and other 
forces at the global poverty reduction conference held in Shanghai in 2004. However, the 
Chinese government is very cautious of some international NGOs who have religious 
purposes and goals of penetration, westernization and subversion. 
On the relations between sovereignty and human rights in the approaches to gover-
nance, China is a strong defender of the sovereignty equality principle of traditional 
international law, disagreeing with human rights beyond sovereignty. The following rea-
sons can explain China’s emphasis on the overwhelming position of sovereignty. Firstly, 
different from the western countries against the background of the birth of state sover-
eignty, the Chinese state sovereignty concept was generated from the escalating national 
crisis (Zhang 2002). Just like many developing countries which had gone through the 
colonial history, China values national independence and sovereign integrity very highly3. 
Secondly, China’s non-violating principle of sovereignty also has realistic concerns of 
protecting China’s Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and human rights issues from western in-
terference. Thirdly, western countries are dominating in the present international sys-
tem. No matter whether in economy, military power or ideology, the West is superior to 
China and other developing countries. China needs the protection of state sovereignty 
to protect from the erosion of mighty international market power and rhetoric power. 
The Laissez-faire policy in international relations is an abdication of responsibility to its 
country and the people. Fourthly, the sovereignty principle is also the natural extension 
of Chinese Confucian thoughts of “family-country-world” order, which stipulates that 
one should first manage its family affairs, then state affairs and finally world affairs. The 
Chinese believe in themselves, and they also believe the other countries can manage their 
own internal affairs. With family affairs managed and state affairs governed, the world 
will be made peaceful. China refuses to denounce countries which have governance 
problems. As for the regions in conflict, upholding the non-interference principle, China 
has been encouraging the countries to conduct peaceful consultations internally to reach 
mediation by themselves. China’s global governance logic lies in the assumption that all 
countries are able to take responsibility in managing their economic, political and social 
affairs, and China believes this is the foundation for a harmonious world. 
In the way of governance, China has tried its best to take part in the civil operations 
organized by international institutions such as the UN. Since 1990, China has begun 
to participate in peacekeeping led by the UN, and by the end of 2011, China dispatched 
about 21,000 personnel on 30 UN peacekeeping missions, which is the highest number 
among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.  However, China does 
not call for military intervention. Even if designated with international peacekeeping 
3 Developed countries and developing countries have different understandings of sovereignty. The latter 
emphasize the independence of sovereignty and incline to take sovereignty as a fence for protecting its 
national interests, while the former focus on the interdependency of nation-states and believe this is the 
best way to maintain its benefits (Cheng 2002). 
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tasks, China still maintains essentially that a country’s problem should be tackled by the 
people of the country, that regional affairs should be addressed by the regional coun-
tries for coordination, and that international society including the UN can only play a 
supplementary and pushing role. No matter in what form to be engaged, the UN must 
help maintain the integrity of sovereignty and territory of the countries involved, must 
respect the collective will of the people of the countries involved, must comply with the 
three principles of being neutral, using no force except self-defence and obtaining the 
agreement of the countries involved. 
Even though the entities beyond nations have had greater and greater influence on the 
current world, and international organizations, non-governmental entities and various 
networks are reshaping the power structure of global politics, China still maintains that 
the country is the main actor in global governance, and the international relations of 
the 21st century are still on the basis of nation-states. The country, instead of the person, 
is the basic unit of governance, as the world is still far away from “Great Unity”. In the 
bargaining process with globalization, China is constantly improving its government 
competency to adapt it to the requirement of globalization. On norms, China maintains 
the equality principle, believing that all sovereign states are independent and equal. “Par 
in parem non habet jurisdictionem”: a country must not impose its will on others. This 
principle is different from that of the West. For example, in the process of aiding Africa, a 
Chinese researcher on African studies said that equality is the soul of China-Africa rela-
tions. China regards the aid to Africa as reciprocal, rather than one-sided. Chinese official 
aid records have never used “donors” or “donees”, discarding the West-Africa relations 
of one being superior and one being inferior, and defining the equal relations between 
China and Africa (Li 2011).
5. Conclusion: Which World is more Beautiful?
As analyzed above, in the process of adapting to and leading globalization, and on the 
basis of their own historical experience, social model and world status, China, the US 
and Europe have developed different global governance concepts and models, enriching 
and substantiating the connotation and denotation of global governance. However, just 
as famous American international political scientist Kenneth Waltz said, like mankind, 
states can by no means be perfect (Waltz 1959). The approaches to global governance of 
the three actors all have shortcomings. The global constitutional governance of the EU 
and its member states which is based on human rights does not fully respect the auton-
omy and self-governance ability of the other regions and countries in the world. The US’ 
global governance of liberalism on the basis of hegemony lacks a self-restrained sense 
of international responsibility, and has the tendency to free itself from international laws 
and norms. The Chinese equalitarian global governance concept based on sovereignty 
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cannot ensure effective cooperation between countries when the world is de facto in 
anarchy, nor the prevention of humanitarian disasters in special circumstances.
According to the international economics theory of liberalism, economic globalization 
has brought about the refinement and professionalization of labour divisions of interna-
tional industries. The highly efficient allocation of resources will boost economic devel-
opment, produce wealth and promote prosperity, but the political issue of social justice 
and fairness must be addressed and realized by governance. From this perspective, who 
can better resolve the social justice issue, who will occupy the moral high ground in the 
competition between global governance models and gain moral attraction? The current 
global governance sketched out by western countries has expanded the range of actors 
and softened the compulsion of policies, but has one fatal flaw, which is a “distorted 
global governance” as described by Tony McGrew. For the most part, it remains highly 
unrepresentative of the world community and scored by huge inequalities of power, in-
fluence, access and resources (McGrew 2002). Not only do such inequalities exist be-
tween countries of the South and North, but, due to objective reasons such as informa-
tion asymmetry and power hegemony, inter-governmental international organizations 
and international NGOs do not have equal opportunities to realize the “equal and free 
competition” acclaimed by western global governance researchers.
China is the world’s largest developing country. It often represents the interests and 
image of the ones “being governed” in the old global governance map, and it is also the 
receiver of western global governance rules and concepts. But, through the summary of 
the existing policies and positions of the Chinese government and the practice of global 
governance, we can see that China’s egalitarian global governance with the nation-state 
as the basic unit has strong legitimacy and justification. In an unequal world, it is always 
the first choice to help yourself rather than waiting for others to help you when seeking 
equality. In China’s exchanges with other countries, China has implemented the whole 
governance concept, whether intentionally or not, and gradually formed models and 
rules. For example, during China’s aid to African countries in infrastructure construction, 
helping the development of the local economy without any political condition indirectly 
improved the governance capacity of the African countries. This was not only beneficial 
to African people’s lives, but also alleviated the immigration pressure of Europe, and was 
thus beneficial to the economic development and social administration of developed 
countries and regions.
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